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INSURED'S BAD FAITH AS SHIELD OR
SWORD: LITIGATION RELIEF
FOR INSURERS?
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*

I.

INTRODUCrION

It is well settled that every contract includes an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.1 Insurance policies, like all other contracts,
contain this implied covenant. The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is perhaps best expressed as a promise implied in every contract that "neither party will do anything which will injure the right of
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." 2 In some early into good faith and fair dealing as a duty of
surance cases, courts referred
3
the parties to the contract.
In 1930, the Wisconsin Supreme Court blended the theories of negligence and bad faith with the theory of breach of the covenant.4 In Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.,5 the court reasoned:
[T]he good-faith performance of the obligation which the insurance company assumed when it took to itself the complete and
exclusive control of all matters that determine the liability of the
insured, requires that it be held to that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence would exercise
in the management of his own business were he investigating and
adjusting such claims. 6
In 1967, the California Supreme Court held, in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,7 that an insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing
* Associate, Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri; B.S. 1980,
Fort Hays State University; M.Ed. 1981, University of Nebraska; J.D. 1988, University of
Kansas.
1. Douglas G. Houser et al., Comparative Bad Faith: The Two-Way Street Opens for
Travel, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 367, 368 (1986-87).
2. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958).
3. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 120 (1987); see, e.g., Brassil
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914) ("But there is a contractual obligation of

universal force which underlies all written'agreements. It is the obligation of good faith in
carrying out what is written.").

4. See Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), affd on reh'g,
204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).

5. Id.
6. Hilker, 204 Vis.at 10, 231 N.W. at 261.

7. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
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when it unreasonably refuses to settle a claim within policy limits." In
fact, the court held that the breach amounted to an independent tort.9

It is now widely recognized that insurers owe their insureds a duty of
good faith and fair dealing under tort law principles. 10 The judicial imposition of a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing is not surprising. In
the insurance context, unlike other contractual relationships, the parties

to the contract (insurance policy) share a special relationship." The special relationship between insurers and their insureds arises out of the

parties' perceived unequal bargaining power and the nature of insurance
contracts, which potentially allow unscrupulous or predatory insurers to
take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes in bargaining for the resolution or settlement of claims.' 2 Insurance contracts are more personal
than commercial; that is, insureds purchase their policies for security and
8. Id. at 177.
9. Id. at 178.
10. See Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1988); Hamed v.
General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 842 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1988); Whyte v. Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 1005, 1013 (1st Cir. 1987); Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
773 F. Supp. 882, 905 (S.D. Miss. 1991), affd, 979 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1992); Schultz v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 764 F. Supp. 1404, 1409 (D. Colo. 1991); Burley v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 773
F. Supp. 844, 859 (S.D. Miss. 1990), affd, 936 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Continental
Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D. Fla. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1052
(11th Cir. 1992); Red Cedars, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 614, 616 (E.D.
Mich. 1988); Globe Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 255 (Ct. App. 1992);
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Idaho 1986); Spencer v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149,155 (Kan. 1980); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970,977 (Mont.
1982); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769,772 (Neb. 1991); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio 1983); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d
997, 100 (R.I. 1988); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex.
1987); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990); see also Henry A.
Hentemann, UninsuredMotorist Coverage Claims and the Bad Faith Issue, 55 DEF. Corms. J.
168, 169 n.8 (1988) ("The cause of action for bad faith in third-party claims seems to have
received almost unanimous acceptance.... ."). Plaintiffs may even recover for their insurer's
alleged bad faith when the event giving rise to a loss is not covered by the policy. See, e.g.,
First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1992) (interpreting
Texas unfair insurance practices statute); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499 (Wash. 1992).
11. Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990) (citation omitted);
Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bad Faith Cases: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 59 DEF.
COUNS. J. 524, 524 (1992).
12. Arnold v. National County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167; see Holmgren v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1992). The Holmgren court observed:
When coverage and liability are established beyond a doubt .... a game of the strong
against the weak can begin. A claim known to be valid and legitimate can be settled
for far less than its actual value if the need for funds by the victim is great enough and
the insurance company is obstinate enough to use its knowledge of that fact to force
acceptance of a lesser sum.
Id. at 578.
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peace of mind, rather than entering into such contracts for financial gain.
Moreover, insureds often need benefits and coverage when they are in
dire or precarious financial straits, thus becoming vulnerable to oppressive tactics by their insurers. By recognizing tort duties, courts were able
to overcome the inadequacy of contract remedies to compensate insureds and to deter insurer nonperformance in third-party cases.13
While the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has always
been viewed as mutual, imposing on both insurers and insureds obligations to refrain from injuring the others' rights to receive contract benefits, 14 its application has been decidedly unilateral.' Bad faith claims
have "been an effective weapon in the hands of insureds and their lawyers for bludgeoning insurers into submission."' 6 Only recently have
courts started wrestling with the question of insureds' bad faith conduct
in claims adjustment 17 and resolution.
This Article examines the argument that insurers defending tort actions for their alleged bad faith should have available to them the traditional tort defense of comparative fault. Comparative fault logically
extends to the use of comparative bad faith as an affirmative defense.
Additionally, Part IV of the Article discusses the concept of "reverse
bad faith." In other words, when may an insurer sue its insured for the
insured's alleged bad faith in the adjustment or resolution of a claim?
II. THE INSURED'S BAD FAITH CLAIM

FOR RELIEF

Insureds may allege that their insurers acted in bad faith when attempting to resolve third-party and first-party claims. Third-party bad
faith claims arise when insurers expose their insureds to monetary liability in excess of policy limits. Insureds bring first-party bad faith claims to
recover for personal losses allegedly covered by their disability, health,
homeowners, uninsured motorist, or property insurance policies. Courts
recognize bad faith causes of action in both contexts.
13. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 120; H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California:Its History, Development and CurrentStatus, 26 TORT & INs. LJ.561, 562 (1991).
14. Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas, Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith: Insured's Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing as Affirmative Defense or
Counterclaim, 23 TORT & INs. LJ.215,216 (1987); see also Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co.,
521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09 (Cal. 1974); Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reins. Corp., 153 Cal.
Rptr. 678, 682 (Ct. App. 1979); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
15. Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 14, at 216.
16. Id.
17. In the insurance claims context, "adjustment" refers to an insurer's determination of
the amount of a loss, the amount of indemnity available to the insured, if any, and if more
than one insurance company is involved, the proportion that each insurer must pay.
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Third-Party Insurance Claims

Only liability insurance can be considered third-party insurance. 18
Liability insurance is described as third-party insurance because the interests protected by the contract are ultimately those of third parties injured by the insured's conduct.' 9 The earliest bad faith cases arose in the
third-party insurance context.20 Early third-party bad faith cases usually
involved insureds' recovery of extra-contractual damages for their insurers' failure or refusal to defend covered claims, or wrongful refusal to
settle claims within policy limits.2 '
The most commonly encountered bad faith scenario-an insurer's
failure or refusal to settle a claim within policy limits-is easily understood by way of example: A, an insured under an automobile liability
insurance policy with a $100,000 limit, is sued by B, who was injured
when A allegedly ran a red light and their cars collided. B's negligence
claim appears sound, and she pleads damages in the amount of $300,000.
A tenders defense of the action to her insurer, which hires defense counsel and takes control of the litigation, as is its right and duty under A's
policy. After discovery closes but before trial, B offers to settle for
$75,000. A's interests and those of her insurer now diverge. From the
insurer's perspective, it has nothing to lose by "playing hardball" and
rejecting B's settlement offer because, under the terms of its policy, its
liability is capped at $100,000, even if B recovers her claimed damages of
$300,000. On the other hand, if the insurer gambles and rejects the settlement offer, the jury might return a defense verdict, thereby saving the
insurer $75,000. From the insured's perspective, however, accepting the
settlement offer would spare her potential financial ruin. If the gamble
fails and B recovers a large judgment, A would be liable for any judgment in excess of the $100,000 policy limits. Simply stated, A's insurer
would be gambling exclusively with A's money."
18. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 43.
19. Id.
20. Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 14, at 217. Bad faith claims were not entertained by
courts until automobile liability insurance was underwritten and automobile liability claims
became prevalent. The creation of a cause of action for bad faith was largely created to combat automobile insurers' unscrupulous claims practices. Joan B. Lefkowitz, New York Third
Party Bad Faith:Is It a Plaintiffs Dream or a Defendant's Nightmare?, 12 PACE L. REv. 543,
544 n.5 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
22. For a similar example, see John F. Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a
Two-Way Street?, 62 N.D. L. REv. 355, 357 (1986).
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In short, an insurer that assumes its insured's defense against a thirdparty claim shares a fiduciary relationship with its insured.' The insured
relinquishes control of her defense and places her potential monetary
liability in the insurer's hands. "That kind of relationship carries with it
a standard of care that exists independent of the contract and without
reference to the specific terms of the contract." 24 Thus, it is logical to
hold an insurer that subordinates its insured's interests to its own liable
for its bad faith conduct.25
In the insurance realm, "bad faith" conduct defies uniform definition.2 6 In Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.,27 the California Court of

Appeal identified eight factors a court must consider in determining
whether an insurer acted properly in refusing to settle an action. The
Brown factors are:
[(1)] [T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of
liability and damages; [(2)] attempts by the insurer to induce the
insured to contribute to a settlement; [(3)] failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; [(4)] the insurer's rejection of advice of
its own attorney or agent; [(5)] failure of the insurer to inform the
insured of a compromise offer; [(6)] the amount of financial risk
to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle;
[(7)] the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of
the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and [(8)]
any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the
part of the insurer.28
The Michigan Supreme Court in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.2 9 described bad faith conduct as the "arbi-

trary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional disregard of the interests of
23. Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775
F. Supp. 718,734 (D. Vt. 1991); Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 n.5 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) ("In third-party insurance actions the insurer assumes complete control over the
insured's defense and, at the same time, acquires a fiduciary duty to act in the insured's best
interests."), vacated on other grounds, 956 F.2d 1052 (11th Cir. 1992); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Said, 590 N.E.2d 1228,1235 (Ohio 1992) (declaring an insurer's duty "analogous to that of a
fiduciary"); JERRY, supra note 3, at 120. But see Todd Brown & J. Clark Kelso, Commercial
Torts: 1992 Developments, 28 ToRT & INs. LJ. 178, 179 (1993) (stating that generally there is
"no fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured").
24. Georgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 (Or. 1992).
25. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 120.
26. See id. at 116.
27. 319 P.2d 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
28. Id. at 75.
29. 393 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 1986).
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[the insured]. ' 0 Similar to Brown, the Commercial Union court identified a number of factors to be used in determining the existence of bad
faith: failure to keep the insured informed of relevant litigation developments; failure to inform the insured of all settlement demands outside
policy limits; failure to solicit a settlement offer or to initiate settlement
negotiations when circumstances warrant; failure to accept a reasonable
compromise offer of settlement when the facts demonstrate obvious liability and serious injury; rejecting a reasonable settlement offer within
policy limits; attempting to coerce or obtain an involuntary contribution
from the insured in order to settle within policy limits; failure to properly
investigate a claim before rejecting a settlement offer; disregarding the
advice of an adjuster or attorney; serious and recurrent negligence by the
insurer; undue delay in accepting a settlement offer within policy limits
when the potential verdict is high; refusing to settle a case within policy
limits after an excessive verdict when the chances of reversal on appeal
are slight; and failing to appeal following a verdict in excess of policy
limits when there exist reasonable grounds for such an appeal. 3 '
Many courts require more than a showing of mere negligence to support a bad faith claim.32 Rather, as a general rule, the insurer must have
engaged in some degree of intentional wrongdoing.3 3 Several states
have tried to find a middle ground, allowing bad faith recovery based on
negligence, but requiring intent if punitive damages are also sought.3 4
The Ohio Supreme Court in Centennial Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual

Insurance Co." made clear that "bad faith, although not susceptible of
concrete definition, embraces more than bad judgment or negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing,
breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partak30. Id. at 164.
31. Id. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted); see also JERRY, supra note 3, at 116-17 (listing factors a trial court may consider in determining "whether liability for bad faith conduct should
exist in a third-party setting").
32. See, e.g., Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589 N.Y.S.2d 510,515 (Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1993); Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554,556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Citizensbank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1986); Dolan v.
Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988).
33. See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 777 (Neb. 1991).
34. These states include California, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See Mock v.
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 1992); Indiana Ins. Co. v.
Plummer Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983); McCullough v.
Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 860-61 (Wyo. 1990).
35. 404 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1980).
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ing of the nature of fraud."3 6 A variety of other specific acts or conduct
may constitute bad faith on an insurer's part. Examples include unduly
or unreasonably restrictive interpretation of policy language, deceptive
practices to avoid paying claims, 37 deliberate misinterpretation of
records or policy language to defeat coverage,3 8 unreasonable litigation
conduct, 39 and the like.
B. First-PartyInsurance
Although early bad faith claims involved third-party actions, courts
soon realized that if a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in third-party insurance cases constituted a tort, the same
should hold true in a first-party setting.4" The 1970 decision by the CaliCourt of Appeal in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance
fornia
Co.4 1 signaled the dawn of first-party insurance bad faith litigation. In
Fletcher, an insurer was held liable in tort for damages caused by its refusal to indemnify its insured under a disability policy.4 2 Comparing
third-party principles with the situation before it, the Fletcher court
stated:
We think that, similarly, the implied-in-law duty of good faith and
fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to
threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously
and without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy. We think
that.., the violation of that duty sounds in tort notwithstanding
that it also constitutes a breach of contract. 43
The suggestion in Fletcher was affirmed and energized by the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,' now widely
acknowledged as the landmark case of first-party bad faith litigation.45
46
The insurers in Gruenberg denied liability for the plaintiff's fire loss.
36. Id. at 762 (quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 187 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio 1962)).
37. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 270-73 (Miss. 1985), affd,
480 U.S. 915 (1987); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 910-11 (Okla. 1982).
38. See Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
39. See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 316-17 (Cal. 1985), abrogatedby
statute as stated in Focus Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 109, 113 n.1
(D.R.I. 1992).
40. Bopp, supra note 11, at 526.
41. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).
42. Id. at 93.
43. Id.
44. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
45. Bopp, supra note 11, at 526.
46. Gruenberg,510 P.2d at 1035.
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Essentially, Aetna and two other insurers believed that the plaintiff committed arson in connection with a fire at his cocktail lounge and restaurant.47 Explaining its endorsement of a bad faith cause of action in the
first-party context, the court stated:
[I]n Comunale and Crisci we made it clear that "[l]iability is imposed [on the insurer] not for a bad faith breach of contract but
for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a
duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." In those two cases, we considered the duty of the insurer to act in good faith and fairly in handling the claims of third
persons against the insured, described as a "duty to accept reasonable settlements"; in the case before us we consider the duty
of an insurer to act in good faith and fairly in handling the claim
of an insured, namely a duty not to withhold unreasonably payments due under a policy. These are merely two different aspects
of the same duty. That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay.
It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under
which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging
its contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal
fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without
proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the
policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
Some states have only recently recognized the first-party bad faith
tort cause of action.49 Wyoming first recognized the tort of first-party
insurance bad faith in 1990 in McCullough v. Golden Rule Insurance
Co.5 0 The Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that such recognition
would provide insurers with "additional impetus for good faith."'" At
worst, the availability of an action in tort would add nothing to insurers'
liability.52 Nebraska finally joined the majority of states in 1991 in
Braesch v. Union Insurance Co.53 The Braesch court identified three factors justifying the application of tort principles to the admittedly contrac47. See id. at 1034-35.
48. Id. at 1037 (citation omitted).
49. Several states consider first-party bad faith claims contractual but allow a broader
range of damages (including punitives), while other states characterize such claims as purely
contractual and confine recovery to strictly benefit of the bargain (contract) damages. See
McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1990).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 859.
52. Id. (quoting White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1018 (Idaho 1986)).
53. 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991).
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tual nature of first-party insurance. First, the insurance industry is
"affected with a public interest," as "plainly evidenced by the high degree of regulation of the insurance industry. ' 54 The public character of
risk and loss distribution requires that all those issuing or receiving benefits act in good faith.55 Second, the "noncommercial aspect of insurance
distinguishes it from other types of contracts for which a breach does not
sound in tort."56 People buy insurance to protect themselves from calamity and to assure themselves of security and peace of mind. When
insurers fail to provide the very item that was the insured's implicit ob57
jective in purchasing the policy, contract damages are inadequate.
Third, the inequity in the bargaining power between insurers and their
insureds differentiates
insurance contracts from "run-of-the-mill
58
contract[s]."
Not all courts have welcomed the extension of the tort of bad faith
from the third-party to the first-party setting. Thus, courts frequently
attempt to distinguish the two.59 In the context of a third-party claim,
the insurer and insured share a fiduciary relationship arising out of the
insurer's exclusive right to contest, litigate, or negotiate the claim. 60 No
such fiduciary relationship exists in a first-party setting. Rather, the
first-party relationship is predominantly adversarial. 61 The insurer and
insured necessarily become legal adversaries and clearly are not principal and agent dealing in trust. 62 Absent a fiduciary duty, insureds do not
need a tort weapon to combat insurers who might otherwise subordinate
insured need only sue its insurer
their insureds' interests. An aggrieved
63
on the policy to obtain relief.
Despite the fundamental differences between third-party and firstparty claims, a number of courts have followed California's lead in
Fletcher and Gruenberg. In fact, an overwhelming majority of jurisdic54. Id. at 774.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 775.
57. Bopp, supra note 11, at 527.
58. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Neb. 1991).
59. JERRY, supra note 3, at 123; see, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795,798-800
(Utah 1985).
60. See JERRY, supra note 3, at 123.
61. I&
62. "Generally, insurer and insured are in an adversary relationship whenever there is any
claim by an insured for loss under any insurance policy." Missouri ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Rauch, 849 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Shafer v. Automobile Club
Inter-Ins. Exch., 778 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
63. JERRY, supra note 3, at 123-24.
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tions that have addressed the issue now recognize the tort of bad faith in
first-party cases. 64
III.

COMPARATIVE FAULT AND COMPARATIVE BAD FA=m

The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is mutual; the duty is
owed by insurers and insureds alike. 65 Accordingly, both parties should
be held to certain standards of conduct during the resolution of thirdparty and first-party claims.66 Reason would seem to dictate that states

recognizing the doctrine of comparative fault should allow an insurer
defending a bad faith action to raise the affirmative defense of negligence or bad faith conduct by its insured. In the bad faith context, comparative fault refers to the comparison of an insured's negligence and an
insurer's alleged willful misconduct. Comparative bad faith is just what
the name implies: a comparison of an insured's willful misconduct
against that of the insurer. In practice, however, courts often fail to
distinguish between the two terms and commonly use them
interchangeably.
A.

ComparativeFault

Comparative fault principles seemingly result in an incongruity when
applied in bad faith cases. Specifically, in comparative fault situations,
an insured's negligence is being compared with an insurer's bad faith. In
other words, mere negligence is being compared with willful misconduct.
64. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Neb. 1991). Rawlings v. Apodaca,
726 P.2d 565, 579 (Ariz. 1986), concisely summarizes the views of courts recognizing the tort of
bad faith in third-party and first-party cases. Workers' compensation insurers are subject to
bad faith liability in many states. See Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742
(Iowa 1992).
65. Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 569-70; Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 610 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Cal. 1980); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198,200
(Cal. 1958); California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App.
1985); Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 21,25 (N.M. 1967); Beck v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
66. Some standards certainly exist. For example, insureds owe their insurers a duty of
cooperation. Particularly, in third-party insurance claims, the insured's duty to cooperate "is
essentially the flipside of the insurer's duty to defend." JERRY, supra note 3, at 555. In any
given case an insured commits to: attending depositions, hearings and trials; providing evidence, or assisting in its discovery and collection; cooperating in or supporting settlement
negotiations; and enforcing the insurer's subrogation rights. Id. In first-party insurance
claims, the insured often must cooperate with the insurer in its investigation to make available
or open property for inspection, give recorded statements, submit to examination under oath,
submit to physical examinations by chosen physicians, and produce documents or records. Id
at 555-56.
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Several courts have rejected this comparison,6 7 while others have expressed bewilderment.6 8 However, the comparison has developed in
California. This is not surprising, since for many years California courts
have led the country in fashioning insurance remedies and have recognized comparative fault in negligence versus
willful misconduct in per69
sonal injury cases for more than a decade.
In 1990, a California appellate court explicitly recognized comparative fault as an affirmative defense to an insurer's claimed bad faith in
Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Company.7

The plaintiff in Patrick

purchased homeowner's insurance from Maryland Casualty Company. 71
In December 1982, a series of windstorms blew shingles from a portion
of the plaintiff's roof.1 2 The plaintiff temporarily repaired the affected
portion of the roof to prevent further damage and submitted a claim.73
Thereafter, the parties' versions of events differed. 74 Maryland Casualty
stated that the plaintiff was in no hurry to resolve the claim, communicated no sense of urgency regarding payment, and mailed in the claim
rather than hand-delivering it or calling. 75 Maryland Casualty asserted
that it, on the other hand, acted reasonably and with due diligence regarding the claim.7 6

The plaintiff alleged that he told the adjuster with whom he dealt that
water was pouring through holes in the roof and that he needed money
to make the necessary repairs.77 The situation progressively worsened.
According to the plaintiff:
[Maryland Casualty]... forced him to get needless documentation and estimates which caused seemingly endless delays; then
told him the check was in the mail; then told him the check must
have been lost; and then delayed further in issuing another one.
67. See, e.g., Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc. 585 F. Supp. 517, 521 n.6 (D.D.C.
1984); Stumpf v. Continental Cas. Co., 794 P.2d 1228,1233 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) ("[I]t would be
nonsensical to hold that an insured who has bargained away control of his own case nevertheless may be liable for conducting it negligently.").
68. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384,
393 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("The applicability of the principle of contributory/comparative negligence to an action for breach of the duty to settle is uncertain.").
69. See Sorensen v. Allred, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443-46 (Ct. App. 1980).
70. 267 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990).
71. Id. at 26.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. I&
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:41

As a result of this delay, three months later in early March of
1983 after further water damage to his house, [plaintiff] called
[Maryland Casualty] again to complain that he still needed the
money, and that water damage to his house was continuing....
[Plaintiff], who was a carpenter... then got up on the roof again
to do the necessary repairs himself. He claimed that [Maryland
Casualty's] employee had told him to do this work himself,
although he also later admitted that doing the work himself might
have been his own idea after all.
In any event, once he got up on the roof again, [plaintiff] decided.., he would need to replace the entire roof.... He went
out to buy the necessary supplies, then later returned. While he
was walking backward on the roof.., he lost his balance and had
to jump eight feet down onto the sidewalk. Both of his heels were
severely injured ....

He presented evidence showing that as a

result he has been disabled from his job as a carpenter ever
since.7 8

In addressing Maryland Casualty's alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 79 the trial court refused the insurer's
request that the jury be instructed to assess the fault of the parties by
comparing the insurer's bad faith with the plaintiff's negligence.8 0 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.8 Maryland Casualty appealed, and
the First District Court of Appeal reversed.'
The Patrick court clearly stated its rationale. First, it noted that
although an appellate court had not previously considered comparative
fault, the absence of precedent was "no good reason to reject it."'83 In84
deed, most defenses now recognized in tort cases were once novel.
Second, the court saw no reason to reject the defense when it was already recognized in products liability actions in which a plaintiff's negligence would be measured against a manufacturer's strict liability.85
"While the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises out of a contractual
relationship between the parties, breach of the duty and ensuing dam78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.

1_993]

INSURED'S BAD FAITH AS SHIELD OR SWORD

ages are governed by tort principles. '86 Third, California courts already
allowed the comparison of fault attributable to negligence and willful
misconduct in personal injury actions. 87 Thus, as previously noted in the
products liability context, such a comparison appeared legally sound. Finally, the court reasoned that comparative fault should not "be avoided
by plaintiff's unilateral manipulation of the mere denomination of his
claim where the defendant contends that, if there was any liability at all,
it arose as a result of negligence; and where that theory is supported by
the evidence. 88 Patrick thus concluded that "comparative negligence
may be available as an affirmative defense in an action for [an insurer's]
bad faith."8 9
In National ChiropracticMutual Insurance Co. v. Cannon,90 the court

held that the insured's negligence outweighed the insurer's, thus negating proximate cause and the insurer's liability for breach of its duty of
good faith and fair dealing. 91 In Cannon, chiropractor Donald Cannon
was sued in a California state court for malpractice. Cannon tendered
his defense to National Chiropractic Mutual Insurance Co. (NCMIC). 92
Ultimately, the plaintiffs prevailed. 93 However, Cannon's conduct in the
malpractice action was a major contributing factor in the plaintiffs' success.94 Cannon refused to consent to settlement, fired NCMIC's chosen

defense counsel shortly before trial, failed to obtain substitute counsel,
attempted to remove the case to federal court, and failed to appear at
trial.9'
NCMIC filed an interpleader action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment absolving it of liability above its malpractice insurance
policy limits with Cannon. 96 Cannon counterclaimed against NCMIC for

the breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 97 The district court
held that NCMIC breached its duty of good faith owed Cannon attend86. Id. (quoting California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821

(Ct. App. 1985)).
87. Id. The application of comparative fault principles to negligent conduct on one hand
and willful misconduct on the other was announced in Sorenson v. Allred, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441
(Ct. App. 1980).
88. Patrick,267 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Nos. 89-15903, 89-16013, 1991 U.S. App. WL 39887 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1991).
91. 1& at *2.
92. 1& at *1.
93. Id

94. Id.
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id. at *1.

97. Id.
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ant to the underlying malpractice action by failing to advise him of a
conflict of interest and his right to engage independent counsel of his
own choice. 98 The court found, however, that Cannon's bizarre conduct
amounted to a breach of his duty to cooperate with NCMIC in his defense. 9

In fact, the court ultimately held that Cannon's conduct was

unreasonable as a matter of law and constituted the proximate cause of
the malpractice award. 100 The court entered summary judgment in
NCMIC's favor, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 01
Cannon is an unusual case because of the insured's grossly negligent
conduct. At the same time, it demonstrates that insurers' need to compare their insureds' fault with their own, and the fairness of allowing
such comparisons.
A slightly different comparative fault situation was litigated in California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Bales.101 The
defendant was an attorney hired in 1983 by an elderly plaintiff, Dorothy
Cooper, to prosecute her personal injury claim against an insured of California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau
(CSAA). 0 3 Attorney Bales failed to energetically pursue the claim, refused to negotiate a settlement with CSAA, and failed to seek an early
trial date to which Cooper was entitled."° The action was finally settled
in May 1987.105 In December 1987, Cooper was represented by new
counsel and sued CSAA for bad faith, alleging that it failed to settle her
personal injury action promptly despite clear liability of its insured.0 6
CSAA pleaded as an affirmative defense Bales's negligence in handling
Cooper's original claim.' 07 CSAA also cross-claimed against Bales for
implied equitable indemnity, alleging that Bales was largely responsible
for the delays that led to Cooper's claimed damages. 0 Therefore,
CSAA argued, Bales should pay his comparative share of those
damages. 10 9
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 270 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Ct. App. 1990).
103. Id. at 422.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 422-23.
107. Id. at 424.
108. Id. at 423.
109. Id.
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The trial court dismissed CSAA's cross-claim, and the First District
Court of Appeal affirmed. 110 The appellate court reasoned that, in such
circumstances, allowing insurers to pursue implied equitable indemnity
claims would create conflicts of interests for plaintiffs' personal injury
counsel:
Where the attorney represents either a first or third party claimant on an insurance policy, the interest of the client is necessarily
adverse to that of the insurer, even though there may not be any
underlying action against the insurer. In such situations, there is a
possibility that conduct of the insurer may subject it to liability for
bad faith. That possibility in turn creates a potential conflict between the attorney's duty to pursue the client's claim vigorously,
and the understandable desire to avoid conduct which might later
be the basis for the attorney's personal liability in indemnity to
the insurer. An attorney who believed that the insurer had engaged or was about to engage in bad faith claims practices might
well choose to avoid such liability by acting to shield the insurer,
even though his or her client would be ill-served by such action."'
The appellate court did, however, recognize the validity of CSAA's
affirmative defense." 2 Bales thus expanded the comparative fault doctrine to allow a comparison of plaintiffs' or insureds' counsel's conduct
with the insurer's conduct.
To date, no other courts have followed California's lead." 3 For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
in Kelly v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." 4 recently concluded that contributory fault is not available as an affirmative defense
to bad faith claims. 15
The application of comparative fault as an affirmative defense to bad
faith claims is both logical and reasonable. Patrick illustrated that the
comparison of an insured's negligent conduct with an insurer's alleged
willful misconduct does not amount to a comparison of "apples and oranges." Insurers are no different from other corporate defendants and,
as any other litigant, they ought to be allowed to plead and prove traditional affirmative defenses to tort claims.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
Id. at 423-24 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 424.
Bopp, supra note 11, at 537.
764 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
Id at 1340-41.
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Comparative Bad Faith

Comparative bad faith rests on the fundamental principle that allowing recovery for an insurer's willful misconduct is illogical or unfair if
the insured did not comply with its contractual obligations or procured
the policy through fraud or the like." 6 Generally, insurers cannot raise
the defense of comparative bad faith when insureds merely breach their
117
contracts.
The concept of comparative bad faith first appeared in 1984 in Fleming v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, Inc." 8 The plaintiff in Fleming
was severely injured when the car in which she was a passenger was
struck by a stolen vehicle." 9 At the time of the accident she maintained
uninsured motorist coverage from Safeco with policy limits of $15,000.12°
Safeco offered $10,000 in settlement of her claim, which the plaintiff rejected. 2 ' The matter was ultimately resolved by a $15,000 arbitration
award more than one year after the accident." After payment of the
arbitration award, the plaintiff sued Safeco for compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that Safeco had been guilty of bad faith, as
well as malicious and oppressive conduct in handling her claim."2 A
jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, awarding her gross compensatory damages totalling $14,300.124 The jury determined that
twenty-six percent of plaintiff's compensatory damages were attributable
116. See Leidesdorf v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 82, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing recovery for insurer's willful misconduct when an insured has not shown compliance
with all obligations under the policy would work an unconscionable result.); Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 803 P.2d 406, 409 n.2 (Alaska 1990) (reasoning that the insured
"cannot now complain about [the insurer's] alleged bad faith in handling the claim where it
arose under a policy procured by activity which itself amounts to bad faith"); Cherry v.
Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 420 (Miss. 1987) ("It is difficult to see how the insurance adjuster can be faulted for bad faith when it is clear that the [insureds] did not cooperate
with him in his investigation."); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Cox, 757 P.2d 499,504 (Wash.
1988) (explaining that a bad faith claim under a state consumer protection statute would not
be served by awarding damages, attorneys' fees, and costs to an insured who attempted to
defraud an insurer).
117. George H. Mitchell & Christopher Robbins, Comparative Bad Faith-"Reverse Bad
Faith." When Should You Make a Claim Against Your Own Insured?, Insurance Claims Supervision Seminar (Defense Research Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Oct. 29-30, 1992, at E-18 (citing
Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled, 832 F.2d 1080
(9th Cir. 1987)).
118. 206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Ct. App. 1984).
119. Id. at 314-15.
120. Id. at 315.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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to her bad faith conduct and seventy-four percent to Safeco's bad faith
conduct.'" The jury also awarded the plaintiff $116,500 in punitive
damages. 26
The court observed that the comparison of the parties' bad faith was
unprecedented, but since neither party objected to the special verdict
form, and since neither party chose to address the issue on appeal, its
propriety was not discussed. 27 Safeco did contend on appeal that the
punitive damages award should be reduced by its insured's bad faith, as
were the compensatory damages. 2s The Fleming court rejected the argument, noting that "bad faith on the one hand, and malice, oppression
or fraud on the other hand are not equivalents, and any attempt to compare them would amount to a comparison of apples and oranges."' 29
An Arizona court reached a different conclusion in another Safeco
case, Borland v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America. 30

In deciding

whether to allow an award of punitive damages against the defendant
insurer, Borland "also [thought] it proper to consider the insured's conduct.' 13 ' The Borland plaintiff had almost immediately consulted with a
insurance attorney upon delay in the payment of her
knowledgeable
32
claim.'
Despite his understanding of insurance law, the attorney did not
properly investigate the claim and generally failed to act with diligence. 33 In fact, the plaintiff's attorney, although well versed in insurance matters, "stood by and permitted the [insurer] to fumble its way
into difficulty without seriously trying to straighten things out."'1 34 As a
result, the court struck the plaintiff's punitive damage award. 35
To date, only one court has expressly addressed the concept of weighing an insured's comparative bad faith against an insurer's bad faith. 36

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
709 P.2d 552 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Mitchell & Robbins, supra note 117, at E-10.
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137
a CalIn California Casualty GeneralInsurance Co. v. Superior Court,
13
defense.
ifornia appellate court recognized and adopted the
The insured plaintiff in California Casualty allegedly suffered a loss
compensable under the uninsured motorist coverage provided by the defendant insurer's automobile liability insurance policy. 139 When the insurer declined to pay the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff pursued the
matter through arbitration and received a favorable award. The plaintiff
then sued California Casualty for its alleged breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and certain statutory violations. 4 The insurer sought leave to amend its
answer to include an affirmative defense of comparative bad faith by the
plaintiff and her former attorney in the handling and management of her
claim. 4 ' The trial court denied the insurer's motion, and the issue
reached the Court of Appeal by writ of mandamus. 4 2
The plaintiff contended that no authority recognized comparative
bad faith as an affirmative defense to an action for an insurer's bad
faith.'4 3 Thus, the comparative bad faith defense was not legally cognizable or, at the very most, constituted a "disfavored defense.""' The
court easily rejected the plaintiffs argument:
Plaintiff's assertion that the defense of "comparative bad faith"
would constitute a "disfavored" defense is not persuasive and, indeed, is a bit puzzling. If, as plaintiff seems to suggest, the fact
that "comparative bad faith" has not been heretofore recognized
in a published appellate opinion as a partial or complete defense
to a bad faith action renders it a "disfavored" defense, we reject
that suggestion. Presumably, most defenses now recognized in
tort cases were at one time novel and not expressly recognized in
published judicial decisions. "Disfavored" defenses are such because of public policy considerations, not because they are
novel. 145
California Casualty was persuaded that, in an appropriate case, an
insured's breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that
contributed to the insurer's untimely resolution of the subject claim

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 821.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 818-19.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id. at 821 (footnotes omitted).
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might constitute at least a partial affirmative defense to the insurer's alleged breach. 146 In so holding, the court noted that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is a "two-way street."' 47 Moreover, "[t]he specific
content of each party's duty is 'dependent upon the nature of the bargain
struck between the insurer and the insured and the legitimate expectations of the parties which arise from the contract.""' There could be
little question, the court observed, that an insurer providing uninsured
motorist coverage has a reasonable expectation that the insured suffering a loss will promptly and accurately furnish all known evidence and
information pertinent to the claim. 149 If an insured's failure to do so
delays or impedes the insurer's investigation or payment of the claim,
the court reasoned, there exists no sound reason that the doctrine of
comparative fault should not be applied to bad faith cases.' 50
Accordingly, the appellate court permitted the insurer to amend its
answer and allege the affirmative defense of the insured's comparative
bad faith.' 5 ' Therefore, under the principles of comparative bad faith as
enunciated in California Casualty, the trier of fact must weigh any bad
faith by the insured against the alleged bad faith of the insurer and reduce any damage award in direct proportion to the insured's assessed
fault.' 52
However, California Casualty has drawn scholarly criticism. Some
commentators question whether the application of comparative bad faith
principles afford insurers a "double defense.' 1 53 Those critics contend
that the application of comparative bad faith allows an insurer to use
identical evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of its conduct and,
at the same time, compel a reduction in the insured's claimed damages. 5 4 Allowing a reduction in an insured's damages because of her
bad faith, even though the trier of fact concluded that the insurer acted
in bad faith notwithstanding the insured's conduct, seems to provide an
insurer with two means of using the same evidence in its favor. 55
146. Id. at 822.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d
1038 (Cal. 1980)).
149. Id. at 822-23.
150. Id. at 823.
151. Id.
152. Mitchell & Robbins, supra note 117, at E-12.
153. WILLiAM M. SRNaoFF E Ar ., INsua~cn BAD FArrH LrrIGAON § 2.03[3][b], at
2-22 (1993).
154. See i
155. Id.
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Courts in states other than California have refused to instruct juries
on comparative bad faith without expressly rejecting the doctrine. In the
Georgia case of Alexander Underwriters General Agency, Inc. v.
Lovett,'56 the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the insured's alleged bad faith. 57 While affirming the trial court, the Georgia Court of
Appeals grounded its decision only on the lack of evidence in the record
to support the instruction.
Lovett, therefore, neither rejected nor endorsed the doctrine. Similarly, in Jessen v. National Excess Insurance
Co.,159 a New Mexico trial court refused to instruct the jury on comparative bad faith. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, stating that it
was "not decid[ing] whether such an instruction necessarily would be in' 60
appropriate in another case.'
If courts prove willing to adopt the comparative bad faith defense, an
interesting and perhaps troubling situation arises in those states employing modified comparative fault. For example, some states bar recovery
to a plaintiff who is fifty percent at fault or greater. In those states, an
insured who hinders or delays investigation or payment of a claim might
recover nothing, no matter how egregious the insurer's misconduct.
Should an insurer's willful misconduct go completely unpunished? Most
courts would probably answer in the negative, given the quasi-public nature of the insurance business. In modified comparative fault states,
then, bad faith actions forseeably might be excepted from the affirmative
defense.
C. Why Should Comparative Fault and Comparative Bad Faith Be
Recognized as Affirmative Defenses to Bad Faith Claims?
Several compelling reasons exist urging courts to recognize insureds'
comparative fault and comparative bad faith as affirmative defenses.
First, the application of comparative fault and comparative bad faith will
take nothing away from plaintiffs with "clean hands" and valid claims,' 6 '
nor will their application offer predatory or unscrupulous insurers appreciable refuge. Absent supporting evidence, comparative fault or comparative bad faith jury instructions simply will not be given. Allowing an
insurer to plead and prove its insured's comparative fault or bad faith
156. 357 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
157. Id. at 265.
158. Indeed, the record demonstrated that the insured "did all he could" to carry out his
related obligations. Id. at 265.
159. 776 P.2d 1244 (N.M. 1989).
160. Id. at 1249.
161. Bopp, supra note 11, at 539.
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merely evens the playing field in the "megastakes pursuit of bad faith
litigation."162
Second, the acceptance of comparative bad faith would return some
reason to the emotionally charged bad faith arena. Insurers are taking a
punitive damage pounding' 63 in bad faith cases that can only encourage
64
creative insureds and unscrupulous attorneys to bait litigation traps.'
Finally, courts cannot logically or fairly enunciate a tort rationale for
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and, at
the same time, reject the concomitant, legitimate, and well-established
defense of comparative fault.' 65 Fidelity to legal doctrine requires that if
the tort is to be embraced-and it apparently is-it must be embraced in
its entirety. 66 If courts are unwilling to do so, a return to contract theory and related remedies is in order. California, by way of Patrick and
California Casualty, has "challenge[d] other jurisdictions to call a spade
a spade, or acknowledge that they are dealing justice of another suit."' 6 7

All states should accept the California challenge.
IV. INSURED'S BAD FAITH AS SwoRD RATHER THAN SHIELD

If an insurer may assert the affirmative defense of its insured's comparative bad faith, may an insurer similarly sue its insured for a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing? In other words, may an insured's
breach provide a basis for affirmative relief? It has been noted that
"[p]recedent exists for the proposition that an insurer may sue its insured to avoid contractual liability on the basis that the insured has acted
in bad faith.' 168 For example, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Altfllisch ConstructionCo., 69 the insured was required to reimburse Liberty
Mutual because its lease of certain construction equipment cut off the
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1384 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that awards of $1000 in compensatory damages supported $500,000 punitive damage
award); Principal Fin. Group v. Thomas, 585 So. 2d 816,818 (Ala.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 649
(1991) (holding that an award of $1000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive
damages was "not excessive" and that "punitive damages should reflect the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct").
164. "If... an exemplary award [hundreds of] times greater than the contract benefit
denied is conceivable, it is a small wonder that an applicant would seek an insurance policy
not merely for financial protection but also as a license to litigate, a means of entry into the
bad faith windfall lottery." Bopp, supra note 11, at 539.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 14, at 224.
169. 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App. 1977).
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insurer's subrogation rights when the equipment was damaged. 170 Altfillisch drew no distinction between an insurer's assertion of comparative
bad faith as an affirmative defense to contractual liability and its employment of the same theory as an action or counterclaim, believing each
to be equally valid.' 7 '

The need for insurers to have available their own bad faith cause of
action is apparent in both third-party and first-party cases. This is especially true in the third-party setting, where commercial insureds are becoming "self-insurers" up to levels far greater than previously
considered, with insurance companies covering only excess potential liability.' 72 Consider the following hypothetical:173 The Mayhem Corporation manufactures construction and farm equipment. Mayhem's
commercial general liability insurance policy, which covers its potential
products liability exposure, has an upper limit of $4,000,000. In order to
keep the related premiums at an acceptable level, however, Mayhem
maintains a self-insured retention (SIR) 174 of $500,000. A young worker

is paralyzed when a Mayhem forklift overturns. The injured worker sues
Mayhem, alleging that the machine was defectively designed. The plaintiff seeks $3,000,000 in compensatory damages. Mayhem tenders the
matter to its insurer, which assumes the defense. After investigating, the
insurer enters into settlement negotiations with the plaintiff and offers to
settle the case for $800,000.
Assume that all of the facts and circumstances indicate that the offer
should be accepted, and it appears that the plaintiff will accept. Notice,
however, that the shoe is now on the other foot. From Mayhem's perspective, the plaintiff's acceptance of the insurer's $800,000 settlement
offer will cost it no less than a jury verdict in the full amount of
$3,000,000, because in either event its liability will be limited to the first
$500,000. This appears to make a gamble on a jury verdict worthwhile,
since there is at least a possibility of a defense verdict or relatively modest (less than $500,000) verdict. From the insurer's perspective, however,
acceptance of the offer will limit its loss to $300,000, while a large verdict
could cost it anywhere from $1,000,000 to $2,500,000.
170. Id. at 92.
171. See id. at 94.
172. Dobbyn, supra note 22, at 368.
173. For similar examples, see id. at 368; Mitchell & Robbins, supra note 117, at E-26 to
E-27.
174. An SIR is best thought of as a deductible, which is a concept familiar to anyone who
has purchased automobile collision or liability insurance.
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The plaintiff accepts the offer, but Mayhem, either seized by selfrighteousness 75 or in an act of bad faith, refuses to contribute its SIR
toward the settlement. Mayhem's insurer now faces at least two unpleasant options: The insurer can either contribute the amount of the
SIR itself, or it can take the case to trial with the attendant risks. With a
$500,000 retention, the insurer can hardly absorb the SIR as a cost of
doing business or as an accommodation to its good client, Mayhem. Indeed, Mayhem has substantial leverage by which it might force its insurer to waive most or all of the SIR, or to allow the action to go to trial.
Notice, however, that Mayhem's means of bringing that leverage to bear
is exactly the type of conduct that courts condemn as bad faith when
practiced by insurers. 1 76 Assuming that a reasonable defendant would
settle the case for $800,000 and Mayhem's refusal to contribute its SIR
furthers its interests to the detriment of its insurer's interests, Mayhem is
guilty of classic third-party bad faith. 7 7
An insured might also conduct its affairs in bad faith in a first-party
setting. For example, an insured might deliberately interfere with or impair its insurer's subrogation rights, or willfully conceal or misrepresent
material facts regarding a loss. An insured might also sue its carrier for
bad faith in an attempt to coerce the carrier into paying a disputed or
fraudulent claim. A commercial insured faced with a catastrophic loss
might also effectively expand its coverage by baiting its insurer into denying coverage or refusing to defend related litigation.
Consider, for example, this hypothetical: ABC corporation operates
a massive warehouse complex in which numerous companies store hundreds of millions of dollars worth of dry goods and foodstuffs. ABC
maintains a policy of comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance
with Floyd's of London with an upper limit of $1,000,000. ABC also has
a warehouse legal liability policy (covering bailed goods, among other
risks) with an upper limit of $10,000,000. A fire sweeps the complex,
destroying or contaminating tons of food product. The insurers of the
companies storing goods in the warehouse complex pay losses exceeding
$50,000,000 and make demand on ABC, threatening subrogation actions
if ABC or its insurers do not make good their losses. Floyd's and the
warehouse legal liability insurer immediately hire defense counsel who,

175. It is not uncommon for a manufacturer to believe that its "quality" product had no
causal role in an accident and that by settling, its insurer is wrongly admitting or implying that
the insured's product is "defective."
176. Dobbyn, supra note 22, at 369.
177. Id.
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in turn, hire forensic engineers and fire investigators to determine the
fire's cause and origin.
ABC has a serious problem: Faced with over $50,000,000 in potential
liability, it has but $11,000,000 in available insurance. Obviously, the potential $39,000,000 uninsured loss would bankrupt the corporation. But
what if ABC's insurers declined to defend pending or threatened litigation, or declined to pay potentially covered claims? ABC's corporate
counsel thus concocts a plan whereby its insurers' experts' access to the
complex is limited, interfering with their cause and origin investigation
and driving up costs; defense counsel are prevented from interviewing
ABC employee witnesses, or must do so under unreasonable conditions;
and documents or records are concealed or access to them delayed.
ABC then provides plausible explanations for these actions, although
the insurers are suspicious of ABC's motives. Ultimately, Floyd's and
the frustrated warehouse legal liability insurer inform ABC that it has
breached its duty to cooperate, deny ABC coverage, and withdraw their
defense.
Subsequently, the insurers of many of ABC's customers file subrogation actions. ABC's counsel consents or stipulates to judgments in the
full amount of the combined claims, agreeing with the subrogated insurers that they will attempt to collect their judgments only from ABC's
insurance. ABC then assigns its causes of action to the subrogated insurers, who sue Floyd's and its warehouse legal liability insurer for their
alleged bad faith in denying coverage and refusing to defend the subrogation actions.
Have ABC's insurers acted in bad faith, or did ABC breach its duty
to cooperate and thus relieve them of liability? That question must ultimately be answered by a jury. Regardless of the outcome, ABC's inhouse counsel has orchestrated quite a coup: Its counsel has preserved
the corporation's assets while effectively increasing ABC's insurance
coverage by a factor of five if its assignees prevail in a bad faith action.
Everything ABC did to favorably position itself was, of course, done in
bad faith.
How will courts respond to such exercises of bad faith by insureds?
How should courts respond? When insurers are guilty of bad faith in
third-party and first-party actions, they are liable for judgments above
their policy limits, compensatory damages and, in many jurisdictions, punitive damages. Assuming the duty of good faith and fair dealing is reciprocal, should not the available remedies be reciprocal? In other
words, should insureds who act in bad faith be liable for judgments in
excess of policy limits or SIRs and be subject to punitive damage
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awards? Insurers pursuing tort actions against their insureds for bad
faith might be said to be pursuing "reverse bad faith" claims.
A.

Judicial Response

Faced with limited precedent, it is difficult to predict how courts will
respond to reverse bad faith claims.178 Generally, there is little in the
history of the judicial treatment of disputes between insureds and insurers to suggest that insurers can expect widespread equal treatment. 7 9
FirstLehigh Bank v. North River Insurance Co.' s0 is one of the few
reported decisions in which an insurer alleged reverse bad faith by its
insured where the court ultimately rejected the cause of action. . In
First Lehigh, the plaintiff bank sued the North River Insurance Co.
("North River") to recover under a banker's blanket bond for a loss attributable to fraud committed by a bank employee." s North River
counterclaimed under three theories, one being the bank's alleged
breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.' 8 3
The bank filed a claim with North River alleging it suffered a loss 8of4
approximately $400,000 due to the dishonest acts of an employee.'
Specifically, the bank claimed that the employee concealed and entered
into unauthorized loan transactions. 85 North River began its routine
claims investigation and requested copies of minutes from directors'
meetings, loan reports, and FDIC examination reports.'8 6 The bank informed North River that the information sought was confidential and
that it would have to enter into a related confidentiality agreement. 8 7
The parties attempted to negotiate an agreement, but before they could
agree on its terms, the bank sued North River to collect on its claim.' 8 8
After a consent protective order was entered, discovery began. 8 9 The
bank provided North River with records that made no reference to the
178. In the two earliest reported decisions in which insurers essentially alleged "reverse
bad faith," the actions sounded in contract rather than in tort. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Tholen, 173 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Ct. App. 1981); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Const. Co., 139
Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App. 1977).
179. Dobbyn, supra note 22, at 377.
180. No. CIV.A.88-7746, 1989 WL 146654 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1989).
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pertinent or relevant unauthorized loans but, instead, referred to letter
of credit transactions. 190 North River later discovered that the records
were altered before their production.' 91 North River alleged that the
bank had deleted all references to loans claimed to be unauthorized or
concealed, that the bank prepared a fraudulent letter of credit which was
reflected in the loan reports, and that the bank altered the board of directors' meeting minutes to reflect the dishonest employee's
termination. 92
North River's counterclaim for the bank's alleged breach of its duty
of good faith and fair dealing posed a novel issue for the court in First
Lehigh. 93 The court recognized that "the utmost fair dealing should
characterize the transactions between an insurance company and the insured."' 94 Nonetheless, the court dismissed North River's counterclaim.' 95 The court concluded: "Breach by the [bank] of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing may permit the insurer to avoid liability under the
policy. However, it will not support a separate action for money damages by [North River] against the [bank].' 96 The First Lehigh court offered no reasoning to support its conclusion. It noted, however, that
dismissal of the counterclaim did not leave the insurer without recourse.' 97 North River remained free to sue the 98bank for malicious use
of process should it prevail in the pending suit.'

The position enunciated by First Lehigh at the very least evidences
little concern for judicial resources and litigants' financial resources.
Rather than resolve all issues in one suit, FirstLehigh suggests a judicial
preference for at least two potential actions, further burdening courts
and increasing parties' litigation costs. Moreover, it deprives insurers of
what would appear to be a compulsory counterclaim for no apparent
reason other than the nature of the defendant's business.
The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the reverse bad faith doctrine in
Tokies & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemnity Co.199 In Midwestern Indemnity, the plaintiff sued its insurer for breach of contract and bad faith
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *2.
194. Id. at *4 (quoting Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa.
1989) (citation omitted)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. No. L-89-395, 1991 WL 355145 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1991).
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when it denied the plaintiff's claim for the theft of a truck. 2 00 The insurer counter-claimed for the insured's alleged bad faith.20 ' Although
Ohio law allows insurers to be held liable for bad faith, the appellate
court refused to hold insureds similarly liable because of the parties' economic and financial disparities.'
Reasoning that there is no duty imposed upon an insurer to act in good faith when there is no disparity of
financial resources, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the insurer's counterclaim.2 "3
Midwestern Indemnity is an intellectually and logically vacant decision. Why should a party's mere identity bar its attempted recovery
when defrauded? There is no philosophical or theoretical basis on which
courts can easily reject the concept of reverse bad faith. If courts are
reluctant to recognize this cause of action because insureds are economic
underdogs lacking insurers' business acumen and leverage, they are mistaken.2 4 Insureds sufficiently sophisticated to use their SIRs as a means
of leveraging litigation costs, or to bait their insurers into a bad faith
defense in order to expand coverage for catastrophic losses, hardly need
judicial shelter. Such insureds are usually corporations with financial
and legal resources, which enable them to face their insurers on a level
playing field. The argument that the duty should not be applied reciprocally because insurance policies are "adhesion contracts" must also
fail2°5 since "[t]he duty of good faith and fair dealing is based upon a
covenant implied
by the courts, and not from a clause drafted by the
6
insurers.

'20

B. How Should the Courts Respond?

Fundamental fairness and equity require that courts recognize a reverse bad faith cause of action for insurers. Moreover, the recognition of
a cause of action for an insured's bad faith requires nothing more than a
limited amount of judicial consistency.207

200. Id. at *2.
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Id. at *13.
Dobbyn, supra note 22, at 372.
See id

206. Id
207. Id. at 371.
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Third-Party Cases or Claims

In the third-party situation described previously, an insured refusing
to contribute its SIR toward settlement or, similarly, an insured refusing
to settle a claim falling completely within its SIR, would do so with the
knowledge that by irresponsibly disregarding its insurer's interests it exposed its insurer to ultimate liability for the full amount of any subsequent judgment.2 a 8 Yet, "[o]n the other hand if the insured gave his
consent to the settlement, he would also be binding himself to the obligation to pay the [claim] up to the amount of the deductible. 20 9 This is
exactly the obligation for which it bargained in order to reduce its
premiums.
An actionable duty of good faith and fair dealing would leave insureds at liberty to exercise their own business judgment, free from risk,
so long as they simply refrained from exercising that judgment in bad
faith.210 Additionally, "there would be little danger that courts or juries
would [search] to find bad faith on the part of insureds." ' ' This has
arguably held true when insurers' conduct is at issue.2 1 2 Courts' and juries' perception of insured Davids versus insurer Goliaths will probably
not fade any time soon. Moreover, insurers-always sensitive to litigation costs-are unlikely to pursue borderline or unwinnable bad faith
claims. Essentially, rejecting reverse bad faith claims in the third-party
context, while simultaneously imposing tort liability on insurers for similar conduct, is tantamount to judicially licensing bad faith conduct by
insureds.
2.

First-Party Cases or Claims

The vitality of first-party reverse bad faith claims depends largely on
the particular facts from which they arise. Where an insured merely aggravates or prolongs claim adjustment, an insurer seeking affirmative relief will surely be confronted with the argument that it has not been
damaged. 1 3 Indeed, insurers may often find it difficult to prove damages sufficient to justify litigation costs and expenses.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 14, at 226. This argument simply ignores economic
realities. When an insurer must devote its capital or human resources to claims activities that
are prolonged or frustrated by an insured's bad faith, that insurer clearly suffers an economic
loss. For example, in a commercial claims context, indemnitory exposures, adjustment costs,
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A strong argument for a first-party action can be made when an insured commits fraud in the presentation of a claim. In such a case, the
equities shift noticeably to the insurer's favor.214 The insurer is then
forced to marshal its resources to investigate and adjust a claim made by
the insured solely to exploit the insured's rights under the policy.215
Such facts certainly justify the insurer's recovery of compensatory-and
perhaps punitive-damages from the insured.2 16 A bad faith cause of
action for insurers is mandated when an insured, in addition to presenting a fraudulent or groundless claim, sues the insurer for bad faith after
the claim is denied' 7 Under these circumstances, the insurer is burdened with the defense of and potential exposure in the frivolous bad
faith action, having already incurred the expense of investigating the
claim 8 Here, the insured's malicious use of the bad faith lever should
be sufficient to form the basis of a punitive damage award.2 19
In summary, an insurer should be able to assert a first-party bad faith
claim against an insured if: (1) the insured knowingly withholds relevant
evidence from the insurer, fabricates or falsifies evidence, or engages in
other fraudulent conduct; or (2) the insured sues the insurer for bad faith
without probable cause, to gain an unfair economic advantage, or for the
purpose of coercing the carrier to pay a disputed claim. 220
V.

CONCLUSION

The doctrines of comparative fault and comparative bad faith enunciated by California courts in Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co.221 and California Casualty GeneralInsurance Co. v. SuperiorCourtrn clearly are in
evolutionary stages. It remains to be seen whether these two doctrines
will be widely accepted by courts, let alone how they might be modified
or refined.l Reverse bad faith has yet to be expressly recognized. Nevand legal expenses stemming from illegitimate claims can be substantial. Id; see also Mitchell
& Robbins, supra note 117, at E-25.
214. Shipstead & Thomas, supra note 14, at 226.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Id.

219. Id.
220. See Mitchell & Robbins, supra note 117, at E-24.
221. 267 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990).
222. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
223. Few commentators or scholars are optimistic that courts will apply the duty of good
faith and fair dealing to insureds and insurers alike.
Regardless of where the equities may lie on this issue, the future course of the law
seems fairly predictable. Until the courts are willing to liberate their thinking from the
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ertheless, logic and legal consistency dictate that all three doctrines be
accepted and applied. The duty of good faith and fair dealing, with accompanying tort remedies for its breach, must be a two-way street open
to insureds and insurers alike.

restrictive notions of fictitious expectations which they have divined and projected into
the minds of passive insureds, and until those same courts are willing to recognize that
commercial and industrial insureds do not fit within the stereotype of "sailors, idiots,
and infants," there is scarcely a chance that the law will deal even-handedly with the
two parties to insurance contracts.
Dobbyn, supra note 22, at 379.

